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DENYING THE CRIME AND 
PLEADING ENTRAPMENT: 
PUTTING THE FEDERAL LAW IN 
ORDER 
The federal law of procedure in entrapment cases is in 
profound disarray. Despite four attempts over the past fifty 
years to clarify the law of pleadings in entrapment cases, 1 the 
Supreme Court has yet to do so successfully. This Note focuses 
on these attempts, and analyzes the issue of whether to permit a 
defendant to plead entrapment while simultaneously denying 
the crime charged. 
Part I reviews the historical development of the entrapment 
defense, the disagreement among the federal circuits with regard 
to alternative inconsistent defenses, and the arguments com-
mentators have made for and against allowing alternative incon-
sistent defenses in entrapment cases. Part II illustrates the im-
portance and outcome-determinative nature of this procedural 
issue through an analysis of the John Z. DeLorean trial.2 Part III 
then reviews the theoretical justifications for entrapment-the 
so-called subjective and objective approaches to entrapment. Fi-
nally, Part IV demonstrates that allowing a defendant to plead 
alternative inconsistent defenses logically follows from both of 
these theoretical justifications for entrapment. 
I. THE PROBLEM OF ENTRAPMENT 
Entrapment is a criminal defense based upon a claim that law 
enforcement officials induced the accused to commit the crime 
charged. 3 The defense is relatively novel,' and it is unique to 
1. Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976); United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 
423 (1973); Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958); Sorrells v. United States, 287 
U.S. 435 (1932). 
2. See Berger, Maverick Entrepreneur in Drug Case, N.Y. Times, Aug. 17, 1984, at 
86, col. 3; Cummings, DeLorean is Freed of Cocaine Charge By a Federal Jury, N.Y. 
Times, Aug. 17, 1984, at Al, col. 6. 
3. 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA Of CRIME AND JUSTICE 704 (S. Kadish ·ed. 1983); see also W. 
LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW 369 (1972): 
567 
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American law.11 Woo Wai v. United States,6 decided in 1915, was 
the first case in which a federal circuit court of appeals acquit-
According to the generally accepted view, a law enforcement official, or an un-
dercover agent acting in cooperation with such an official, perpetrates an entrap-
ment when, for the purpose of obtaining evidence of a crime, he originates the 
idea of the crime and then induces another person to engage in conduct consti-
tuting such a crime when the other person is not otherwise disposed to do so. 
Cf. P. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES 509-11 (1984) (noting a sharp disagreement as 
to the theory underlying entrapment and that the different theories, in turn, breed dif-
ferent formulations of the defense). 
Whatever its formulation, entrapment is never a defense to a crime involving conduct 
that causes, or threatens to cause, bodily injury. MooEL PENAL CooE § 2.13(3) note on 
status of section (Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
4. The earliest case in which a federal court considered a claim of entrapment was 
United States v. Whittier, 28 F. Cas. 591 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1878) (No. 16,688). Although the 
Whittier court acquitted the defendant without reaching the entrapment question, id. at 
593, a concurring opinion nevertheless declared, "No court should, even to aid in de-
tecting a supposed offender, lend its countenance to ... contrivances for inducing a 
person to commit a crime." Id. at 594 (Treat, J., concurring). 
State courts considered the entrapment defense several years before the federal courts. 
In Board of Commissioners v. Backus, 29 How. Pr. 33, 42 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1864), the court 
quoted from Genesis 3:13 to argue that entrapment was not a valid defense: " 'The 
serpent beguiled me and I did eat.' That defence was overruled by the great Lawgiver 
.... [T]his plea has never since availed to shield crime ... and it is safe to say that 
under any code of civilized, not to say [C)hristian ethics, it never will." See Groot, The 
Serpent Beguiled Me and I (Without Scienter) Did Eat-Denial of Crime and the En-
trapment Defense, 1973 U. ILL. L.F. 254; Note, The Serpent Beguiled Me and I Did 
Eat-The Constitutional Status of the Entrapment Defense, 74 YALE L.J. 942 (1965). 
The Groot article, supra, considers the same issue as does this Note, but takes a differ-
ent approach. Groot focuses on several relatively narrow grounds to attack the rule that 
requires the defendant to admit the crime charged before pleading entrapment. He ar-
gues, inter alia, that it is not inconsistent for a defendant simultaneously to deny the 
mental element (scienter) of the crime charged and to plead entrapment, and that, in 
any case, to precondition the entrapment defense on admission of the crime is a due 
process violation. This Note, in contrast, takes a more general and theoretical approach, 
arguing that the courts can best solve the alternative defense question by reasoning from 
the underlying theories of entrapment. See infra text accompanying notes 75-93. 
5. United States v. Henry, 727 F.2d 1373, 1376 n.3 (5th Cir. 1984) ("[T]he entrap-
ment defense is a unique one, unacknowledged by any law but ours."); Mikell, The Doc-
trine of Entrapment in the Federal Courts, 90 U. PA. L. REV. 245, 246 (1942) 
("[E]ntrapment as an excuse to a charge of crime seems to be a purely American doc-
trine."); see also G. WILLIAMS, TEXTBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW 594 (2d ed. 1983). English 
courts have considered the defense of entrapment, but have rejected it on the ground 
that it would be unworkable. Id. at 594 n.2. The Canadian courts have likewise consid-
ered and rejected the defense. Id. (citing Regina v. Bonnar, 34 C.R.N.S. 182 (Nova Scotia 
1975)). See generally Barlow, Entrapment and the Common Law: Is There a Place for 
the American Doctrine of Entrapment?, 41 Moo. L. REV. 266 (1978) (considering 
whether English Jaw should incorporate a theory of entrapment). 
6. 223 F. 412 (9th Cir. 1915). The prosecution charged Woo Wai with conspiring to 
bring illegal immigrants into the United States. The evidence at trial showed that a gov-
ernment agent had induced the defendant to commit the alleged offense, but the trial 
judge nevertheless held that entrapment was not a valid defense. Id. at 413. On appeal, 
the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that it was error for the judge below to have refused 
to instruct the jury on the entrapment defense. Id. The court declared that to hold oth-
erwise would be contrary to public policy. 
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ted a defendant because the government had entrapped him. 
Not until the 1932 Supreme Court case of Sorrells v. United 
States7 did the defense finally achieve prominence in American 
criminal law.8 
A. A Brief History of the Entrapment Defense 
The rise of the entrapment defense was due to two simultane-
ous and related developments. In the late nineteenth century, a 
flurry of legislation proscribed activities such as prostitution, ho-
mosexuality, gambling, and trafficking in obscene materials, nar-
cotics, and liquor. Because such vice offenses normally occur in 
private and involve a willing victim who will not complain, the 
then prevailing methods of police detection were inadequate.9 
To enforce the new statutes, law enforcement agencies thus had 
to rely on informants and undercover agents to a much greater 
extent than ever before.10 
Although entrapment has now been a firmly established crimi-
nal defense for over half a century, courts have disagreed as to 
whether a defendant should be able to plead denial and entrap-
ment as alternative def enses.11 On one side of the issue is the 
7. 287 U.S. 435 (1932). 
8. Nearly every American jurisdiction now recognizes the entrapment defense. P. 
ROBINSON, supra note 3, at 509. 
9. See Rotenberg, The Police Detection Practice of Encouragement, 49 VA. L. REV. 
871, 874 (1963). 
10. See Donnelly, Judicial Control of Informants, Spies, Stool Pigeons, and Agent 
Provocateurs, 60 YALE L.J. 1091, 1098-99 (1951); Note, Entrapment: Time to Take an 
Objective Look, 16 WASHBURN L.J. 324, 326-27 (1977). 
Organized law enforcement bodies were not prevalent in the United States until the 
middle of the nineteenth century. Therefore, not surprisingly, the entrapment defense, 
like the exclusionary rule, did not come of age until the early twentieth century. For an 
historical discussion of the use of police informers, see generally Donnelly, supra, at 
1091-98. 
11. For a discussion of the disagreement among the federal circuits on this issue, see 
infra notes 27-56 and accompanying text. 
Other procedural problems that have significantly troubled the courts are (1) whether 
evidence of the defendant's past conduct should be admissible at trial; (2) whether the 
defendant should bear the burden of proof; and (3) whether the issue should be decided 
by the judge or by the jury. For an excellent discussion of all of these issues, see Park, 
The Entrapment Controversy, 60 MINN. L. REV. 163 (1976). For materials specifically 
concerning the burden of proof in federal courts, see THE FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL 
COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS§§ 103, 702(1) (1971); MODEL PENAL 
CODE§ 2.13(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1962); Annotation, 23 A.L.R. FED. 767 (1976). For 
discussions concerning the admissibility of the defendant's past conduct, see Note, The 
Entrapment Doctrine in the Federal Courts, and Some State Court Comparisons, 49 J. 
CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE Sci. 447, 450-52 (1959) [hereinafter Note, Entrapment 
Doctrine); Note, Entrapment: A Critical Discussion, 37 Mo. L. REV. 633, 648-50 (1972); 
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formidable "inconsistency" theory.12 This theory recognizes that 
a defendant who denies the crime charged, while simultaneously 
alleging that a policeman or undercover agent entrapped him 
into committing that same crime, is presenting logically incon-
sistent and mutually exclusive defenses. The proof of one of the 
defenses disproves the other: with no crime, then, by definition, 
there could not have been an entrapment; conversely, with an 
entrapment, then, by definition, there must have been a crime. 13 
Therefore, the inconsistency theory maintains that unless the 
defendant admits the crime charged, an instruction on the en-
trapment defense should be unavailable, for it would confuse the 
jury14 and impede the search for truth. 111 
Three significant arguments countervail the inconsistency the-
ory. First, the common law has always permitted criminal de-
fendants to interpose alternative defenses, however inconsis-
tent.16 Moreover-, the courts have never articulated a justification 
for excepting entrapment cases from the traditional common law 
rule. 17 Thus, just as a defendant may plead, for instance, "No, I 
didn't do it, but yes, if I did, I was insane,"18 a defendant should 
Note, The Defense of Entrapment: Next Moue-Due Process?, 1971 UTAH L. REV. 266, 
269-71; Annotation, 61 A.L.R. 3D 293 (1975). For discussions regarding the function of 
the judge and jury, see P. ROBINSON, supra note 3, at 516; Starrs, Comment on Entrap-
ment, in WORKING PAPERS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMI-
NAL LAWS 303, 324-25 (1970). 
12. The principal rationale for the position that the defendant may not simultane-
ously plead denial and entrapment is that the two defenses are inconsistent. Most courts 
and commentators refer to this rationale as the "inconsistency" theory. See, e.g., United 
States v. Annese, 631 F.2d 1041, 1046 (1st Cir. 1980); Note, Denial of the Crime and the 
Availability of the Entrapment Defense in the Federal Courts, 22 B.C.L. REV. 911, 917 
(1981). 
13. See United States v. Kaiser, 138 F.2d 219, 220 (7th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 320 
U.S. 801 (1944). But see United States v. Greenfield, 554 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1977); Hans-
ford v. United States, 303 F.2d 219, 221 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (en bane). 
14. See Note, supra note 12, at 918 (citing Eastman v. United States, 212 F.2d 320, 
322 (9th Cir. 1954)). 
15. See Sears v. United States, 343 F.2d 139, 143 (5th Cir. 1965); Henderson v. 
United States, 237 F.2d 169, 172 (5th Cir. 1956). 
16. 21 AM. JuR. 2D Criminal Law § 191 (1981); 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 54 (1961); 
see also United States v. Demma, 523 F.2d 981, 985 (9th Cir. 1975) (en bane). 
17. Demma, 523 F.2d at 985 ("There is no conceivable reason for permitting a de-
fendant to assert inconsistent defenses in other contexts but denying him that right in 
the context of entrapment."). But see Groot, supra note 4, at 260-61 for a suggestion 
that courts may be reluctant to apply the normal common law rules because entrapment 
is typically used as a defense to violations of statutory, not common law, crimes. There is 
no authority for this proposition. 
18. See Demma, 523 F.2d at 985 n.6 (citing cases allowing inconsistent defenses); see 
also Groot, supra note 4, at 259 n.27 (citing cases allowing a defendant to deny the 
criminal act and claim insanity or self-defense, or to plead an alibi and provocation or 
intoxication). 
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also be able to claim, "No, I didn't do it, but yes, if I did, the 
policeman entrapped me." 
Further, an accused can never assert defenses that are based 
on facts that are totally inconsistent. Perjury will deter this; the 
threat of perjury should be adequate to preserve the truth-seek-
ing function of the court. Moreover, should the defendant 
choose not to take the stand, he will be unable to assert any 
factually inconsistent defenses. The inconsistency rule thus pre-
vents no more factual inconsistency than perjury has in the past. 
Second, application of the inconsistency theory raises serious 
constitutional questions. Although the entrapment defense still 
has no judicially affirmed constitutional basis, 19 the Constitution 
may provide three powerful arguments:20 (1) the fourth amend-
ment right to unlawful searches and seizures, which may sub-
sume the illegal fishing expedition involved in entrapment cases; 
(2) the fifth amendment right to be free from self-incrimination, 
which may preclude police from coercing an otherwise innocent 
individual to commit a crime; and (3) the fourteenth amend-
ment right to due process of law. 21 
A rule that requires the defendant to admit the crime in order 
to plead entrapment effectively eliminates the most important 
part of the prosecution's burden of proof-proving the underly-
ing offense beyond a reasonable doubt. 22 Once a court has re-
lieved the prosecution of this burden, then it has also weakened, 
if not totally removed, the presumption of a defendant's inno-
cence, thereby violating due process.23 Whatever the merits of 
these constitutional arguments, they should at least give pause 
to those courts that adhere to the inconsistency theory. 
19. Comment, The Assertion of Inconsistent Defenses in Entrapment Cases, 56 
lowA L. REV. 686, 688 (1971). 
20. See id. at 688-90. 
21. Id. 
22. 
When a defendant in an entrapment case is forced to admit the crime in order to 
assert the defense of entrapment the government is automatically relieved of 
proving the decisive issue in the case-commission of the crime beyond a reason-
able doubt. The only burden of proof which must be sustained by the govern-
ment is the negation of the defense of entrapment. 
Id. at 691-92. 
23. See Groot, supra note 4, at 271; see also United States v. Demma, 523 F.2d 981, 
986 (9th Cir. 1975) (en bane) ("Continued adherence to [the inconsistency theory] would 
have generated serious constitutional problems by conditioning the assertion of a defense 
on the defendant's yielding his presumption of innocence, his right to remain silent, and 
his right to have the Government prove the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable 
doubt."). 
572 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 20:2 
Finally, the Supreme Court has itself indicated that denial 
and entrapment are permissible alternative defenses. Writing for 
the majority in the seminal Sorrells case, Chief Justice Hughes 
stated: 
It is assumed that the accused is not denying his guilt 
but is setting up special facts in bar upon which he relies 
regardless of his guilt or innocence of the crime charged. 
This, as we have seen, is a misconception. The defense is 
available, not in the view that the accused though guilty 
may go free, but that the Government cannot be permit-
ted to contend that he is guilty of a crime where the gov-
ernment officials are the instigators of his conduct. The 
federal courts in sustaining the defense in such circum-
stances have proceeded in the view that the defendant is 
not guilty. The practice of requiring a plea in bar has not 
obtained. Fundamentally, the question is whether the de-
fense, if the facts bear it out, takes the case out of the 
purview of the statute because it cannot be supposed 
that Congress intended that the letter of its enactment 
should be used to support such a gross perversion of its 
purpose.24 
Some decisions construe this language to mean that entrapment 
is not a defense that assumes that the crime was committed; in-
stead, entrapment negates that any crimes have occurred.u If 
this construction is correct, then a defendant could, consistently 
and simultaneously, claim that he is innocent and that the gov-
ernment entrapped him. 26 
24. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 452 (1932). 
25. See, e.g., Demma, 523 F.2d at 983 ("In Sorrells, Chief Justice Hughes expressly 
rejected the Government's contention that a claim of entrapment necessarily involved an 
admission of guilt and that it was in the nature of a plea in bar.") (construing Sorrells, 
287 U.S. at 452); see also infra note 26. 
One should recognize, however, that the question of alternative defenses was not 
before the Sorrells Court because, at trial, the defense admitted the crimes charged and 
relied solely on the entrapment defense. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 438-40. Hence, with regard 
to the alternative defense question, the language of the Sorrells opinion is dictum. 
26. See generally Groot, supra note 4, at 261-62, which suggests that once Sorrells 
declared that entrapment was a negation of a crime, the inconsistency theory should 
have disappeared. Because courts had already developed their own rules regarding alter-
native defenses in entrapment cases and because the Sorrells Court did not deal directly 
with the issue, the theory persisted. 
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B. The Disagreement Among the Federal Circuits27 
Most of the early court decisions that considered the question 
adopted the inconsistency theory, concluding that the entrap-
ment defense should be unavailable where the accused refused 
to admit the charged offense.28 By the middle of the 1950's, the 
federal courts almost unanimously subscribed to this view. 29 By 
the late 1960's, however, a large number of conflicting circuit 
court precedents existed on the issue. During the past fifteen 
27. For a more extensive discussion of the disagreement among the federal circuits, 
see Note, supra note 12, at 911-29. The author divides circuit court positions on the 
issue into four distinct categories: (1) where admitting the crime is a prerequisite to the 
entrapment defense (the Third and Seventh Circuits); (2) where the absence of a denial 
is the only precondition to pleading entrapment (the First, Second, Fourth, and Tenth 
Circuits); (3) where alternative defenses are allowed (the Ninth and District of Columbia 
Circuits); and (4) where the entrapment defense is available provided there is no testi-
mony that is "too inconsistent" with that defense (the Fifth Circuit). Id. 
To illustrate the controversy among the circuits, the present analysis relies heavily on 
the foregoing categories. The Note, id., however, is out of date in its discussion of Fourth 
and Fifth Circuit precedents. The Fifth Circuit had long permitted a defendant to plead 
simultaneously denial and entrapment if, on the particular facts of the case, the inconsis-
tent defenses would not "hinder the search for truth." See, e.g., Henderson v. United 
States, 237 F.2d 169, 172-73 (5th Cir. 1956), United States v. Henry, 727 F.2d 1373, 1377 
(5th Cir. 1984). The Fifth Circuit called this rule into question, however, by rejecting 
earlier cases holding that a defendant may deny culpable intent and still plead entrap-
ment. The Fifth Circuit has since decided the issue en bane. See United States v. Henry, 
749 F.2d 203 (5th Cir. 1984) (en bane). See infra notes 40-50 and accompanying text. 
The Fourth Circuit has also recently come down against the assertion in testimony of a 
defense inconsistent with entrapment. See United States v. Dorta, 783 F.2d 1179 (4th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 3274 (1986). 
28. See Groot, supra note 4, at 260 (citing People v. Murn, 220 Mich. 555, 190 N.W. 
666 (1922), and Nutter v. United States, 289 F. 484 (4th Cir. 1923)). In Murn, the court 
held that it was impermissible for the defendant to claim entrapment when he denied 
making the illegal liquor sale: "Defendant is in no position to urge that the act com-
plained of was induced by entrapment of the officers, for he claims that he made no 
sale .... " Murn, 220 Mich. at 558, 190 N.W. at 666. In Nutter, the defendant both 
denied selling morphine and alleged that the government agent had entrapped him into 
selling the substance. The court declared that the entrapment allegation was inconsistent 
with the denial of the crime. Nutter, 289 F. at 485. As Groot points out, neither the 
Murn nor the Nutter court cited any authority for disallowing the entrapment defense 
simply because the defendant had denied the crime. But see Scriber v. United States, 4 
F.2d 97, 98 (6th Cir. 1925) ("The [trial] court refused to submit the defense of entrap-
ment, and did this on the theory that defendant's testimony was inconsistent with that 
defense. In a proper case, it would seem that defendant should have the benefit of this 
defense, even though such inconsistency exists."). 
29. By 1954, the Courts of Appeals for the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, 
Ninth, and District of Columbia Circuits had all held, or at least recognized by necessary 
inference, that a defendant must admit the crime charged before raising the entrapment 
defense. See Annotation, 54 A.L.R. FED. 644 (1981); Annotation, 61 A.L.R. 2D 677 (1958). 
Only the Sixth Circuit suggested that the alternative defenses were permissible. Scriber 
v. United States, 4 F.2d 97 (6th Cir. 1925). 
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years the controversy has not subsided. The courts continue to 
search for a conclusive answer to the problem. 
Among the federal circuits,30 four distinct positions currently 
prevail on whether a defendant may plead denial and entrap-
ment as alternative defenses.31 The Third and Seventh Circuits 
continue to adhere to a pure form of the inconsistency theory, 
holding that an accused must admit the crime charged in order 
to plead entrapment.32 In contrast, the Ninth and District of Co-
lumbia Circuits now completely reject the inconsistency theory 
and hold that the accused need not admit the crime, nor any of 
its elements, in order to raise the entrapment defense. 33 
The First, Second, Fourth, and Tenth Circuits steer a middle 
course between the two foregoing positions. These jurisdictions 
neither will permit a defendant to plead entrapment if he denies 
committing the crime charged, nor will they require the defend-
ant to take the stand in order to admit the crime affirmatively. 
In other words, entrapment and denial are permissible alterna-
tive defenses in these jurisdictions provided that the defendant 
does not testify.34 The rationale for this compromise rule rests 
30. See Annotation, 5 A.L.R. 4TH 1128 (1981), for the positions of the state courts on 
alternative defenses in entrapment cases. 
31. Despite earlier cases adhering to the inconsistency theory, the Eighth Circuit has 
recently reopened the question. Compare Kibby v. United States, 372 F.2d 598, 601 (8th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 931 (1967) (leaving question undecided) with Ware v. United 
States, 259 F.2d 442, 445 (8th Cir. 1958) (finding denial of crime to preclude the entrap-
ment defense). 
32. See United States v. Liparota, 735 F.2d 1044, 1048 (7th Cir. 1984), rev'd on other 
grounds, 471 U.S. 419 (1985); United States v. Hill, 655 F.2d 512 (3d Cir. 1981); United 
States v. Shoup, 608 F.2d 950, 964 (3d Cir. 1979); United States v. Watson, 489 F.2d 504 
(3d Cir. 1973); United States v. Johnston, 426 F.2d 112 (7th Cir. 1970). 
33. See United States v. Demma, 523 F.2d 981, 985-86 (9th Cir. 1975) (en bane) 
(overruling earlier Ninth Circuit cases supporting the inconsistency theory); Hansford v. 
United States, 303 F.2d 219, 221 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (en bane). 
34. In United States v. Annese, 631 F.2d 1041, 1045 (1st Cir. 1980), the trial court 
refused to allow the defendant to assert entrapment unless he testified, whereupon he 
took the stand. On appeal, the First Circuit reversed, holding that its earlier precedents 
precluding the alternative defenses of entrapment and denial were factually limited to 
instances in which the defendant voluntarily took the stand and denied the crime 
charged. Id. at 1046. The court then went on to decide that silence is not inconsistent 
with the entrapment defense and that, therefore, a defendant could plead entrapment as 
long as he does not affirmatively deny the charged offense. Id. at 1046-47. 
Similarly, in United States v. Valencia, 645 F.2d 1158, 1172 (2d Cir. 1980), the court 
held that an accused may rely on the alternative defenses when he neither takes the 
stand nor introduces any other evidence suggesting that he did not commit the charged 
offense. See also United States v. Mayo, 705 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1983) (denying crime in 
testimony precludes assertion of entrapment defense). 
In United States v. Worth, 505 F.2d 1206, 1209 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 
964 (1975), the court stated that testimony from the accused was not a prerequisite to 
reliance upon an entrapment defense and that, accordingly, one need not take the stand 
and admit the crime charged in order to raise the defense. 
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on degrees of inconsistency, and, in an entrapment case, for a 
defendant to remain silent is less inconsistent than to deny the 
crime actively.36 
The evolution of the Sixth Circuit's position represents an 
anomaly. Whereas most circuits originally adopted the inconsis-
tency theory but eventually deviated from it, the Sixth Circuit 
originally rejected the theory36 but eventually accepted it. As 
late as 1967, the circuit held that the inconsistency between de-
nying the crime and pleading entrapment did not preclude sub-
mission of both pleas to the jury.37 A few years later, however, 
the Sixth Circuit modified its prior rule by holding that a de-
fendant may not deny every element of the charged offense and 
still plead entrapment.38 Then, in a 1975 decision,39 reaffirmed in 
The Note, supra note 12, at 916-19, characterizes the foregoing cases as standing for a 
"defendant may not deny" rule. This terminology is somewhat misleading, for the rule in 
these cases is really that the defendant need not admit the crime-he may exercise his 
fifth amendment privilege not to testify-in order to plead entrapment. Even if the de-
fendant does not testify, these cases still permit the defendant to request an instruction 
on his participation in the crime and, thereby, to deny the crime by implication. There-
fore, these cases more accurately stand for the proposition that the defendant "need not 
affirmatively admit the crime," or that he "may choose to remain silent." 
Finally, in United States v. Dorta, 783 F.2d 1179 (4th Cir. 1986), the Fourth Circuit 
rejected a prior court decision and held that a defendant could not deny the crime in his 
testimony and simultaneously plead entrapment. 
35. 
It is inconsistent for an accused to take the stand and deny the commission of 
the crime charged and then assert his right to a charge on the defense of entrap-
ment. However, where there is evidence of governmental inducement, it is not 
fatally inconsistent for an accused to keep silent in the hope that the jury will 
not find that the government has proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt, but 
ask that the jury be charged on the defense of entrapment if it should find the 
commission of the allegedly criminal acts. The law allows this much 
inconsistency. 
United States v. Annese, 631 F.2d 1041, 1047 (1st Cir. 1980) (emphasis added) (citations 
omitted) (quoting Gorin v. United States, 313 F.2d 641, 654 n.10 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 
374 U.S. 829 (1963)). 
36. See Scriber v. United States, 4 F.2d 97 (6th Cir. 1925); supra note 29. 
37. See United States v. Baker, 373 F.2d 28, 30 (6th Cir. 1967) (citing Scriber v. 
United States, 4 F.2d 97 (6th Cir. 1925)). 
38. 
The defendant here took the witness stand and absolutely denied that he did 
any of the acts necessary to constitute the crimes charged. In the course of his 
testimony he did state that he would have been unwilling to commit any of these 
crimes while denying that he did any of the acts. We ... hold that the defendant 
may not absolutely deny every act necessary to constitute the offense and then 
claim entrapment on the part of the Government agents. 
United States v. Shameia, 464 F.2d 629, 631 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1076 
(1972). 
39. United States v. Mitchell, 514 F.2d 758 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 847 
(1975). In this case, the defendant admitted receiving money from a government agent, 
but denied culpable intent, as had the defendants in Scriber, 4 F.2d 97, and Baker, 373 
F.2d 28. The court, ignoring both of those precedents, held that "the district judge prop-
576 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 20:2 
1983,40 it totally rejected the permissibility of alternative de-
f ens es and adopted the inconsistency theory. 
Finally, of the various positions on the alternative defense 
question, the Fifth Circuit's is the least clear-cut. Like most of 
the other jurisdictions, the Fifth Circuit once subscribed to the 
inconsistency theory.41 In the late 1950's, however, the circuit 
created a novel formulation under which a defendant could 
plead both denial and entrapment provided that, in the particu-
lar case, the two defenses were not so inconsistent as to "hinder 
a search for truth. "42 In applying this formulation, the Fifth Cir-
cuit has, over the years, excepted the following cases, among 
others, from its general prohibition against alternative defenses: 
where the defendant admits committing overt acts in further-
ance of a conspiracy but denies knowledge of that conspiracy,43 
where the government's own case-in-chief injects substantial evi-
dence of entrapment,44 and where the defendant admits the al-
leged physical acts but denies culpable intent.411 
Nevertheless, in United States v. Henry (Henry 1),46 the Fifth 
Circuit suddenly withdrew the last of the foregoing exceptions 
and held that a defendant must admit culpable intent in order 
to assert the entrapment defense.47 The Henry I court's reason-
ing was threefold: first, unless the defendant has admitted cul-
pable intent, he has not really admitted anything at all for if the 
erly precluded appellant from relying on the defense of entrapment." Mitchell, 514 F.2d 
at 761. 
40. United States v. Whitley, 734 F.2d 1129 (6th Cir. 1984); United States v. Ranzoni, 
732 F.2d 555 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 916 (1984); United States v. Bryant, 716 
F.2d 1091 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1009 (1984). 
41. See Marko v. United States, 314 F.2d 595, 597-98 (5th Cir. 1963) (citing Rodri-
guez v. United States, 227 F.2d 912, 914 (5th Cir. 1955)). 
42. Henderson v. United States, 237 F.2d 169, 172 (5th Cir. 1956) ("The common 
goals of all trials ... is to arrive at the truth, and it would seem that inconsistent posi-
tions should be permitted or not permitted according to whether they might help or 
hinder a search for the truth. Perhaps that may depend upon the degree of inconsis-
tency."); see supra note 27. 
43. Henderson, 237 F.2d at 173. 
44. United States v. Greenfield, 554 F.2d 179, 182 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 
U.S. 860 (1978). 
45. Id. at 182-83. By removing the requirement that the defendant admit culpable 
intent, this case carved out an enormous exception to the general rule that the defendant 
must admit the crime in order to plead entrapment. In almost all entrapment cases, 
liability hinges on proof of the mens rea, not of the actus reus. The Fifth Circuit belat-
edly realized this and overruled Greenfield. See infra notes 46-50 and accompanying 
text. 
46. 727 F.2d 1373 (5th Cir. 1984). 
47. Id. at 1377. 
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intent was not culpable, then the act itself was not criminal;"8 
second, the culpable intent exception is so large that it swallows 
up the general rule;49 and third, originally no compelling reason 
to allow this exception existed. 110 
.In United States v. Henry (Henry /)/1 however, the Fifth Cir-
cuit decided en bane to reverse Henry I. It decided that entrap-
ment is neither an excuse nor a justification-rather, it simply 
makes an entrapment victim innocent-so a defendant should 
not be forced to concede guilt as a prerequisite to claiming en-
trapment.112 The Fifth Circuit held that a defendant may either 
assert entrapment and not testify113 or assert entrapment and 
deny culpable intent in testimony.11" 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 
chose to follow old Fifth Circuit precedent. 1111 It held that a de-
fendant may plead entrapment but may not deny the act unless 
the government's own case-in-chief injects substantial evidence 
48. Id. With the exception of strict liability offenses, an act standing alone is, of 
course, never criminal, just as culpable intent standing alone is never criminal. The im-
portant point is that proof of criminal intent can turn a mere act into a criminal one, just 
as proof of a criminal act can turn mere culpable intent into criminal intent. 
49. 
Id. 
In crimes ... of which culpable intent is an element, it is certainly at least as 
significant a one as any other, so that refusing to concede the commission of. 
more than two-thirds or three-fourths of the elements of the crime is as effec-
tively done by disputing intent as by disputing any of the crime's requisite fac-
tual elements. 
The court should have phrased this argument in different words. In most entrapment 
cases, the evidence that the defendant committed the actus reus is overwhelming, see 
infra notes 50-59 and accompanying text, and the only real issue is whether he possessed 
the requisite mens rea. Thus, a requirement that the defendant admit the actus 
reus-which he could not refute to begin with-may often be no requirement at all. 
50. 
By what rhyme or reason, we may fairly ask, does Greenfield, select [culpable 
intent] to exempt from the required concessions rather than any other? We as-
certain none except the opinion's suggestion that it is somehow not "impermissi-
bly" inconsistent to deny culpable intent with one breath and admit it in the 
next. That intent, however, is an element of the crime like any other, and while 
it may be easier to both admit and deny it than to do so as to a physical act, it 
seems to us every whit as inconsistent. 
Since we find no significant force in the reasoning by which an exception is 
made for the element of intent alone from the concessions required to raise the 
entrapment defense, we conclude that this element should be treated no differ-
ently from any other .... 
United States v. Henry, 727 F.2d 1373, 1377 (5th Cir. 1984). 
51. United States v. Henry, 749 F.2d 203 (5th Cir. 1984) (en bane). 
52. Id. at 210. 
53. Id. at 211. 
54. Id. at 213. 
55. United States v. Morrow, 537 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 956 
(1977). 
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of entrapment into the case.116 This decision occurred before 
Henry II, so, should the Eleventh Circuit choose to follow cur-
rent Fifth Circuit precedent, Henry II may portend change m 
the Eleventh Circuit. 
II. THE JOHN z. DELOREAN TRIAL: A CASE STUDY ON THE 
OUTCOME-DETERMINATIVE NATURE OF ALTERNATIVE 
INCONSISTENT DEFENSES 
In many cases, a court's choice of the type of pleadings al-
lowed may be dispositive of the trial's outcome. Accepting the 
inconsistency theory to deter the defendant could, as will be 
shown, affect a defendant's trial outcome. In most entrapment 
cases, the prosecution has charged the defendant with a strict 
liability offense-such as liquor or narcotics possession viola-
tion-for which it need not prove mens rea.117 Moreover, because 
the government can employ surveillance techniques, use marked 
money, and, where necessary, undertake searches immediately 
before and after the transaction, 116 the prosecution will normally 
have overwhelming evidence. A defendant who denies the crime 
under such circumstances would simply squander any credibility 
he might have had on the entrapment issue.119 Furthermore, even 
if the charged offense does require proof of mens rea, and even if 
the evidence is not overwhelming, a skillful cross-examiner could 
still diminish the defendant's credibility by pointing out the in-
consistency of the alternative defenses. 60 Thus, perjury is no 
more deterred than it would be without the inconsistency 
theory. 
The decision whether to adopt the inconsistency theory may 
be decisive to the trial outcome. The applicable rule on alterna-
tive inconsistent defenses, far from having a merely neutral, pro-
cedural effect, will almost always carry implications for the liti-
gating parties. Careful examination of the highly publicized case 
56. United States v. Haimowitz, 725 F.2d 1561 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1072 
(1984). 
57. Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 532 (5th ed. 
1980). 
58. Id. 
59. Id. 
60. See generally Comment, United States v. Demma: Assertion of Inconsistent De-
fenses in Entrapment Case Allowed, 1975 UTAH L. REV. 962, 966-68 (noting that a de-
fendant would lose all credibility with a jury if he were both to deny the crime and plead 
entrapment, and arguing that either the judge should pass upon the entrapment defense 
or there should be a separate trial on the issue). 
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involving the automobile industry executive, John Z. DeLorean, 
vividly illustrates this point. 
On October 19, 1982, the Federal Bureau of Investigation ar-
rested DeLorean61 for conspiring to sell more than twenty-four 
million dollars worth of cocaine.62 On March 5, 1984, following 
nearly a year and a half of hearings, the trial finally began.63 To 
prove its case, the prosecution produced overwhelming evi-
dence:64 sixty-five audio recordings and over five hours of video-
tapes, all showing DeLorean and two others plotting the drug 
deal with federal undercover agents.611 
Responding to this evidence, the defense argued that the gov-
ernment had perpetrated an entrapment, impermissibly taking 
advantage of DeLorean's celebrated financial troubles to lure 
him into a fake investment.66 The defense lawyers did not call 
DeLorean. as a witness;67 they primarily attacked the credibility 
of the prosecution's witnesses.68 
Because the trial took place in the Federal District Court for 
the Central District of California, the Ninth Circuit's 
rule-allowing a defendant to plead entrapment without admit-
ting the crime or any of its elements-applied.69 Accordingly, 
even though DeLorean had not taken the stand to admit partici-
pation in the conspiracy, the district court judge instructed the 
jury on the entrapment defense. 70 On August 16, 1984, following 
61. Cummings, supra note 2, at B6, col. 2. 
62. Berger, supra note 2, at B6, col. 3. 
63. Cummings, supra note 2, at B6, col. 3. 
64. Berger, supra note 2, at B6, col. 3. 
65. Cummings, supra note 2, at B6, col. 3; see also Brill, Inside the DeLorean Jury 
Room, Am. Law., Dec. 1984, at 94, col. 1, 104, col. 2 (One of the videotapes showed 
DeLorean reaching for plastic bags of cocaine and exclaiming "It's good as gold ... gold 
weighs more than this, for God's sake," then toasting to the group's success, whereupon 
the undercover agents arrested him.). 
66. Cummings, supra note 2, at B6, col. 2. 
67. Margolick, A Case for DeLorean, N.Y. Times, Aug. 17, 1984, at 86, col. 1. 
68. Cummings, supra note 2, at 86, col. 5. The defense called only four wit-
nesses-DeLorean 's secretary and three government agents. Whereas the prosecution's 
case lasted three months, the defense's lasted a little over three weeks-twelve trial days. 
Brill, supra note 65, at 99, cols. 1, 2. 
69. See United States v. Demma, 523 F.2d 981 (9th Cir. 1975) (en bane). 
70. The judge submitted a list of 68 instructions, most of which referred to "the usual 
matters of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, circumstantial evidence, [and] the definition 
of conspiracy." Brill, supra note 65, at 101, col. 2. Instruction 56 concerned the entrap-
ment defense. It listed only three requirements and did not say that the jurors had to 
find that DeLorean had admitted .the conspiracy: 
1) The idea for committing the acts had to have come from the "creative activ-
ity" of the government agents or informant; 
2) DeLorean had to have been induced by the government into committing the 
acts; and 
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lengthy deliberations, the jury finally produced its verdict: not 
guilty on all eight counts charged in the indictment.71 
Immediately after the trial, the press, legal commentators, and 
the defense lawyers universally presumed that DeLorean's guilt 
or innocence had played no part in the case and that, instead, 
the entrapment defense had persuaded the jury.72 Subsequent 
interviews with the jurors, however, demonstrated that this in-
terpretation was far from correct-while only four (perhaps five) 
jurors found an entrapment, eight (perhaps seven) concluded 
that DeLorean was innocent and thus never even considered the 
entrapment issue. 73 
The Ninth Circuit's rule on alternative defenses may have de-
termined the outcome of the case. Assuming the jurors would 
not change their findings if the court retried the case applying 
the inconsistency theory, a hung jury, or even a conviction, could 
easily result. 74 One possibility is that DeLorean would again 
choose to plead entrapment. In this case, he would be required 
to take the stand and admit the crime. Besides losing his most 
persuasive argument-innocence-DeLorean would be forced to 
give the prosecution the opportunity to attack his entrapment 
defense on cross-examination. A hung jury could easily result 
3) DeLorean had to have not been "ready and willing" to commit the acts before 
the government agent or informant induced him into becoming involved. 
Id. at 103, col. 3. 
71. The first count was the basic conspiracy charge. Five other counts were depen-
dent on the basic charge, and. thus became moot once the jurors acquitted DeLorean on 
the first count. The two final counts related to traveling in interstate commerce with 
intent to sell drugs. See Brill, supra note 65, at 104, col. 1. 
72. Margolick, supra note 67, at B6, cols. 1, 2 (quoting several law professors, includ-
ing Alan Dershowitz of Harvard who remarked, "DeLorean's guilt or innocence played 
no role in this. All the attention was focused on the Government .... "); see also Lind-
sey, Jurors Cite Entrapment and Failure to Prove Case: Jurors Tie Verdict to 2 Key 
Factors, N.Y. Times, Aug. 17, 1984, at B6, col. 6 ("[Defense attorney Howard L.] Weitz-
man asserted that the jurors had condemned the Government as having entrapped Mr. 
DeLorean and that they wanted to 'send a message to the Department of Justice' that 
'setting up' citizens to commit crimes was wrong."). 
73. Brill, supra note 65, at 104, col. 1 ("Soon a vote was taken on the first count. It 
was 12-0 not guilty. In all, four, maybe five, jurors had been won over by the entrapment 
defense, while the others simply hadn't found the conspiracy."); see also id. at 105, col. 3 
("[T]here's something alluringly deceptive about a 12-0 verdict, for it implies more una-
nimity than really exists. The jurors here only agreed on the verdict, not on the reasons 
for it, not on the entrapment issues, and not on anything of policy import about the 
government's conduct." (emphasis added)). 
74. One cannot conclude, however, that the result would necessarily be different. If 
DeLorean admitted the crime and pleaded entrapment, the eight jurors who thought 
that there was no conspiracy might still have found an entrapment. But assuming that 
DeLorean again chose not to testify, a hung jury would necessarily result. See supra note 
73 and accompanying text. 
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because only one of the eight jurors who thought that DeLorean 
was innocent would need to find no entrapment. 
The other possibility is that DeLorean would again choose not 
to testify. There would necessarily be a conviction or a hung 
jury, for DeLorean would forfeit his entrapment defense, and 
the four jurors who thought that he was entrapped would have 
no choice but to vote for conviction. Thus, the applicable rule on 
alternative defenses could have made a material difference in 
the outcome of this trial. 
III. THE Two THEORETICAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR ENTRAPMENT 
Because a defendant's fate can hinge on whether he is allowed 
to plead entrapment while simultaneously denying the crime, 
the courts should pay close attention to the particular procedure 
for pleading that they adopt. Whatever the strengths of the vari-
ous rationales for and against alternative defenses, all have a 
common weakness-they ignore the theoretical basis for entrap-
ment. Until the courts consider the doctrinal basis for entrap-
ment, attempting to solve the procedural problems that the de-
fense presents makes little sense. The courts should not develop 
procedural rules in a vacuum; instead, they should fashion those 
rules around a solid theoretical framework. 
The Supreme Court first formulated the entrapment defense 
in Sorrells v. United States.n In that case, defendant Sorrells 
sold alcohol to a government agent in violation of the National 
Prohibition Act. The trial court held as a matter of law that 
there was no entrapment, and the Second Circuit affirmed. On 
appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that where evi-
dence exists that government officials implanted the criminal de-
sign in the accused's mind, for a court to withhold the entrap-
ment issue from the jury is reversible error.78 
. The majority opinion, written by Chief Justice Hughes, re-
jected both estoppel and public policy as the doctrine's founda-
tion. 77 The true basis for the defense, the Court declared, was 
that Congress did not intend criminal statutes to apply where 
the government's own agents induced an otherwise innocent per-
son to commit the offense.78 In determining whether the defense 
75. 287 U.S. 435 (1932). 
76. Id. at 441-42. 
77. Id. at 444-51. See generally Note, Entrapment Doctrine, supra note 11, at 448-49 
(discussing the doctrinal basis for the entrapment defense). 
78. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 448. 
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applied, i.e., whether the government induced an otherwise inno-
cent person, the defendant's predisposition to commit the crime 
would be the pertinent issue.79 Accordingly, Sorrells explained 
that the focus of the entrapment defense was the subjective 
blameworthiness of the defendant, not the objective propriety of 
the government agents' conduct.80 
Justices Roberts, Brandeis, and Stone concurred in the result, 
but disagreed with the doctrinal foundation that the majority 
laid for the defense. Writing for the minority, Justice Roberts 
characterized the statutory construction approach as pure fic-
tion. 81 Entrapment's true foundation, he stated, lies in public 
policy-it is a device to discipline police conduct, not to excuse 
the defendant.82 Roberts also attacked the majority's "subjec-
tive" approach, arguing, "[This procedure], in effect, pivots con-
viction in such cases, not on commission of the crime charged, 
but on the prior reputation or some former act or acts of the 
defendant not mentioned in the indictment."83 Thus, in the mi-
nority's view, the defendant's blameworthiness is irrelevant. The 
only significant issue is whether, objectively speaking, the police 
employed impermissible methods. 
The dispute over the proper rationale for the defense contin-
ued. The Supreme Court again examined entrapment in Sher-
man v. United States, 84 and the result was as controversial as 
Sorrells. In Sherman, a government informer developed a rela-
tionship with the defendant, who was then being treated for nar-
cotics addiction. After the informer repeatedly requested illegal 
drugs from the defendant, the defendant finally supplied them. 
The majority refused to abandon Sorrells, and Justice Frank-
furter wrote a separate concurring opinion arguing that the 
Court should have followed Justice Roberts' position.811 
In the Supreme Court's most recent decision on entrapment, 
Hampton v. United States,86 only a plurality of the Court was 
willing to reaffirm the position of the Sorrells majority. Hamp-
79. Id. at 451. 
80. See S. REP. No. 605, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., Pt. 1, at 111 (1977). 
81. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 455-56 (Roberts, J., concurring). 
82. Id. at 458 ("Whatever may be the demerits of the defendant or his previous in-
fractions of law these will not justify the instigation and creation of a new crime, as a 
means to reach him and punish him for his past misdemeanors."). 
83. Id. at 459. 
84. 356 U.S. 369 (1958). 
85. Id. at 380 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("The courts refuse to convict an en-
trapped defendant, not because his conduct falls outside the proscription of the statute, 
but because, even if his guilt be admitted, the methods employed on behalf of the Gov-
ernment to bring about conviction cannot be countenanced."). 
86. 425 U.S. 484 (1976) (3a2-3 decision). 
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ton involved a defendant who was convicted of buying heroin 
from federal undercover agents. Because the defendant con-
ceded that he was predisposed to commit the offense, the trial 
court had refused to instruct the jury on entrapment. On appeal, 
the defendant argued that, despite his predisposition, the public 
policy objective of entrapment to discipline overreaching police 
conduct entitled him to the defense. Accordingly, Hampton 
presented the unique situation in which the defendant's predis-
position was clear and the police involvement was great. The 
outcome of the case thus depended on whether the Supreme 
Court would follow the subjective or objective approach.87 
Writing for the plurality, Justice Rehnquist rejected outright 
the public policy rationale for entrapment and held that, be-
cause the defendant's predisposition was clear, the trial court 
was correct in disallowing the entrapment defense.88 If, however, 
the government violated the defendant's due process rights by 
employing impermissible methods, then the defendant could 
prosecute the agents involved. 89 
The plurality opinion provoked another vigorous dissent, with 
three justices criticizing the plurality's reaffirmation of Sorrells 
and arguing in favor of the objective theory of entrapment.90 
Significantly, two justices wrote a separate opinion arguing that, 
in extreme cases, police over-involvement could rise to the level 
of a constitutional due process violation.91 
Despite the Supreme Court's continued adherence to the sub-
jective approach, several federal circuit courts have adopted the 
objective test.92 Moreover, numerous states long ago abandoned 
the subjective in favor of the objective approach, and some have 
even done so by statute.93 
87. See P. ROBINSON, supra note 3, at 514. 
88. Hampton, 425 U.S. at 488-89. 
89. Id. at 490. 
90. Id. at 495 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
91. Id. at 493 (Powell, J., concurring). 
92. See, e.g., Greene v. United States, 454 F.2d 783, 786-87 (9th Cir. 1971); Accardi v. 
United States, 257 F.2d 168, 172-73 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 883 (1958). See 
generally Note, supra note 10, at 329-40 (listing courts that ignore the Sorrells holding). 
93. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13(1) note on status of section (Proposed Official 
Draft 1962); see also Marcus, The Development of Entmpment Law, 33 WAYNE L. REV. 
5, 29-36 (1986). 
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IV. THE PROCEDURAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE Two THEORIES 
Under both theoretical justifications for entrapment, a de-
fendant should logically be able to plead entrapment even if he 
has denied the charged crime. Under the subjective approach, 
entrapment is like any other legal excuse and should be ac-
corded similar treatment, that is, allowing alternative inconsis-
tent defenses. Furthermore, under the objective approach with 
the focus on police activity, not on the accused or his manner of 
pleadings, alternative inconsistent pleadings should be allowed. 
A. The Subjectiv~ Approach 
The subjective approach focuses on the accused. If a court fol-
lows the Sorrells majority position, then it essentially recognizes 
entrapment as an excuse. By focusing on the predisposition of 
the defendant, the court is asking whether the defendant is suffi-
ciently blameworthy to be held accountable for the crime. En-
trapment, so formulated, is not very different from excuses such 
as self-defense, defense of others, defense of property, and du-
ress. Just as we will find not blameworthy, and therefore acquit, 
a defendant who was· coerced to perform a crime, so too, with a 
subjective view of entrapment, we will find not blameworthy a 
defendant who was otherwise innocent.94 Under the subjective 
approach, entrapment is "as closely associated with normative 
culpability as is the claim of duress. In one case the actor is se-
duced by the wiles of a duplicitous police officer; in the other he 
is coerced by the threats of an overbearing will."911 
If entrapment in its subjective formulation is an excuse, then 
a court should apply the same rule concerning alternative incon-
sistent defenses that it applies to other excuses. Because all 
courts would permit a defendant to plead, "I didn't do it, but if 
I did I should be excused because I acted in self-defense," it fol-
lows that it is also permissible for a defendant to argue, "I didn't 
94. A common misconception about the entrapment defense is that it operates by 
vitiating the mens rea element of a crime. One should recognize that culpable intent 
exists only if the defendant acted "knowingly" or "purposefully." This means that as 
long as the defendant's "conscious objective" was to perform the act in question, he is 
deemed to possess the requisite mens rea. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (Proposed Official 
Draft 1962). 
95. G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 542 (1978). 
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do it,. but if I did I was entrapped."96 Courts should thus accord 
entrapment this same procedural treatment. 
B. The Objective Approach 
If a jurisdiction follows the Roberts-Frankfurter objective ap-
proach, then the defendant should also be allowed to plead en-
trapment as an alternative inconsistent defense. Where entrap-
ment functions to guard against overreaching police activities, 
the focus should not be on the defendant, much less on his man-
ner of pleading. Rather, the entire focus should be on the chal-
lenged governmental activity. The applicable principle in the ob-
jective view is one of public policy: "[The] courts must be closed 
to the trial of a crime instigated by the government's own 
agents. No other issue, no comparison of equities as between the 
guilty official and the guilty defendant, has any place in the en-
forcement of this overruling principle of public policy."97 From 
an objective approach, entrapment should not focus on the ac-
cused and thereby allow inconsistent defenses. 
CONCLUSION 
A lack of harmony exists among the circuits in the federal law 
regarding pleadings in entrapment cases. This Note points out 
the outcome-determinative nature and importance of pleadings 
in an entrapment case through the example of the John Z. 
DeLorean trial. This Note then argues that defendants should 
be allowed to plead alternative inconsistent defenses-a plea of 
innocence coupled with a plea of entrapment. Unlike other com-
mentators, this Note argues that the logic for allowing alterna-
tive inconsistent defenses naturally arises from the theoretical 
bases for entrapment, the so-called subjective and objective ap-
proaches to the defense. 
The subjective approach leads to alternative inconsistent 
pleadings because it arguably treats entrapment as an excuse, 
and criminal cases involving an excuse allow alternative incon-
sistent pleadings. The objective approach also calls for the adop-
tion of alternative inconsistent pleadings, because the focus of 
the inquiry is on the challenged government activity, not on the 
96. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
97. United States v. Sorrells, 287 U.S. 435, 459 (1932) (Roberts, J., concurring). 
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manner of the defendant's pleadings. Accordingly, both federal 
and state courts should allow alternative inconsistent pleadings 
in criminal entrapment cases. 
-Richard C. Insalaco & Peter G. Fitzgerald 
